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Framing Economic Populist Rhetoric: The Economically Aggrieved Find a Voice
Abstract
The use of economic populist rhetoric seems to be a growing trend in America. Current literature situates
a positive relationship between economic insecurity and support of populism, however the strength
between the two is debated. Furthermore, much is focused on individual or country level economic
insecurities as it relates to populist support, but little is focused on economic insecurities at levels in
between the individual and countries. Even less is written on how often populists employ economic
populist messaging, as it relates to the economic insecurities in which they are speaking. In order to
determine if a relationship between the two exists, this paper will look at U.S. state-level economic data
and compare it to speeches made by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders during the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Election campaign. I expect to find a positive relationship between U.S. state-level economic insecurity
and the amount of populist’s speech dedicated to economic populist messages. This is an important
topic to study as it relates to the structure of elections and the desire for populists to tailor their
messages in order to gain voter support and political power.
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Abstract
The use of economic populist rhetoric seems to be a growing trend in America. Current
literature situates a positive relationship between economic insecurity and support of populism,
however the strength between the two is debated. Furthermore, much is focused on individual or
country level economic insecurities as it relates to populist support, but little is focused on
economic insecurities at levels in between the individual and countries. Even less is written on
how often populists employ economic populist messaging, as it relates to the economic
insecurities in which they are speaking. In order to determine if a relationship between the two
exists, this paper will look at U.S. state-level economic data and compare it to speeches made by
Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election campaign. I
expect to find a positive relationship between U.S. state-level economic insecurity and the
amount of populist’s speech dedicated to economic populist messages. This is an important topic
to study as it relates to the structure of elections and the desire for populists to tailor their
messages in order to gain voter support and political power.
An Introduction to Populism
Populism as a movement often entails an “us versus them” approach, with populist
leaders using fearful rhetoric that presents events or ideological failures as crises that they alone
can fix (Mudde 2009; Mueller 2017; Moffitt 2014). Populists identify failures and tailor their
rhetoric to rouse an affected group. The economy, for populists, is a particularly strong target to
focus their rhetoric on.
Looking at economic populist rhetoric is ripe given the rise of populism in western
nations in the past few decades. Rising populist movements and leaders across the world make it
necessary to study how populists maneuver their rhetoric in such a way to gain a base of
followers on the platform of extreme and overly simplistic ideas (Blassnig, Buchel, Ernst &
Engesser 2018; Gerstle & Nai 2019 ; Mueller 2017 ; Moffitt 2015). On the topic of rhetoric
itself, scholars such as Busby, Gubler, and Hawkins have developed theories on how populists
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frame problems and foment divisions between a target audience (the pure) and the identified
problem (the corrupt). Scholars such as Benjamin Moffitt have researched the role of
performance as it relates to turning failures into active crises. Other scholars also take a broad
look at how a nation’s economy and ability to deliver job stability affects support for populist
movements (Mughan, Bean & McAllister 2003; Rodrik, 2017). However, most literature has
looked at country level data and its relationship to populist support. Given that the United States
is a vast nation with many regional and state-level differences, a gap in the literature appears.
This paper will attempt to bridge that gap by researching possible connections between U.S.
state-level economic data and populist’s use of economic populist rhetoric. The rest of the paper
is dedicated to the review of populist rhetoric formation and the role that the economy plays in
the rise of populist movements. This will be possible by looking at economic data from states in
the United States and speeches and debates of the two populist candidates from the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.
Populist Messaging
Populist leaders are in a constant search for perceived or actualized problems within a
society, and by capturing the raw emotion from the population, seek to implement new
systematic changes (Moffitt, 2014). Candidates running on populist platforms often times focus
their narrative on ideas that they are specialized in (Gerstle & Na,i 2019). While not wholly
detached from mainstream political candidates, populists are masters at simplifying complex
problems and ideas (Gerstle & Nai, 2019; Blassnig et al., 2018; Mueller, 2017).
In addition to simplification, populist candidates can identify a group of citizens who
hold grievances against governments and other large scale organizations. After finding a base of
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aggrieved voters, populist leaders inevitably must come up with solutions, however generalized
they may be. In order to contrast themselves against establishment candidates, populists rely on
ideas outside the mainstream in order to please their aggrieved base (Gerstle & Nai, 2019) . A
general theme of populists is the idea of returning power to the people, among other highly
directly democratic languages. Populists rely on listening to “the least advantaged” and making
vocal their platform by “bringing the excluded [ideas] into politics” (Mueller, 2017). A key
sub-population that has been identified as the least advantaged are those that have seen negative
returns as a result of increased economic globalization.
Globalization and Rapid Economic Change
A particular form of populist grievance relates to the economic security of individuals,
groups, and the nation. In theory, when the economic fortunes of a country go through recessions
or depressions, it exacerbates economic populist appeals. One theory postulates that economic
populism rises during economic instability, and is a key component among those who have been
on the “losing” side of globalization and the free-market system set up after World War II
(Formisano, 2017; Mueller, 2017). While all populist leaders will assign blame on a certain
group in order to explain structural failures, populists who focus on economic insecurity tend to
project blame onto immigrants, supranational organizations, or a corrupt economic elite (Mudde,
2009; Rodrik, 2017; Gerstle & Nai, 2019)
Even though it has been observed that economic grievances are real either through
perception or actualized, it must be clear that there are limitations on the strength of economic
populism as the conduit for populist support. The argument that losers “in the process of
modernization” support populist leaders stems from Max Weber and other researchers of the
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1950s and 1960s (Mueller, 2017). Their conclusions, while not wholly rejected, do not take into
account non-economic factors that might influence one’s support for populism. Additionally,
Mueller found that “personal socioeconomics is less correlated to populist support, but instead on
a more general assessment of the situation” (Mueller, 2017). While this may diminish the
strength of economic populist messages, it does not reject a populist candidate targeting potential
supporters through dispositional means.
It is evident that those who perceive themselves to be in hardship are more likely to
support populism. It is also clear that during general economic downturns, amidst prolonged
economic changes, people who feel their economic status as stagnant or decreasing will be more
likely to turn to a populist who draws upon their economic anxieties. Especially amidst the
backdrop of the 2008 Great Recession, presidential candidates and the media paid particular
attention to the white working class voters (Formisano, 2017). Despite this going against
conventional wisdom, Princeton political scientist Larry M. Bartels finds there has been a trend
over time that white voters “continue to attach less weight to social issues than to economic
issues” (Formisano, 2017).
Economic anxiety is not singular to a particular industry’s decline, but can become
specifically targeted at a group or nation. Cas Mudde, in his book Populist Radical Right Parties
in Europe, lays out four types of enemies populists focus on. The four groups are: 1) Within
State/Within Nation, 2) Within State/Outside Nation, 3) Outside State/Within Nation, and 4)
Outside State/Outside Nation. The first plays to nativist rhetoric, the second plays to xenophobic
and anti-immigrant rhetoric, the third is less common as it attacks expats and emigrants, and the
fourth attacks external group, nations, and to a broader extent, globalism (Mudde, 2009).
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However, this typology is only geared toward right-wing populist framing. For left-wing
populism, their enemy is organizations, groups, and individuals who are “profit-maximizers who
threaten the material interests of ordinary hard working citizens'' (Hameleers, 2018). Taking a
page out of the “losers of economic globalization” argument, Hameleers surmises that the
left-wing connects to “a collective sense of losing out because of the negative influence of
economic actors'' and their destruction of ordinary citizen’s labor (Hameleers, 2018).
In terms of the overall global economy, advanced globalization and free trade agreements
have become less influential in expanding economic opportunities. Lack of opportunities is an
important reason why globalization becomes politically more contentious in its advanced cycles.
For the United States specifically, two major events opened the doors to greater international
trade: the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and
China’s membership into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001. However, trade
along cannot explain the growing demand for populism by those economically disaffected.
Another reason that accelerated globalism is increased global capital mobility. With greater
mobility, companies can move production and invest in developing nations with lower wage
workers. This not only hurts domestic labor power, but creates an unbalanced negotiating
platform between workers and the companies they work for (Rodrik, 2017). The liberalization of
capital has statistically demonstrated long lasting declines in the labor share of income and
statistically significant increases in the GINI index.
The rapid globalization of the U.S. economy starting in the 1990s shifted nearly five
million manufacturing laborers to other industries, primarily service based. The economic
anxiety created in shifting industries and a decline of wages pushes those affected to find a
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channel for their economic frustration. This creates a demand for a populist leader who can craft
a message that resonates with those affected. As populist leaders spring up with their own crafted
messages, they not only capture the original group of disaffected voters, they also create a
greater supply of populist-minded voters (Rodrik, 2017).
Turning Failure into Crisis
A core fundamental of populist rhetoric is the framing of language to assign blame on a
group that is perceived or actually corrupt. Populist leaders will often present their group as
“pure” and “moral,” while contrasting it with a group of corrupt elites. Anyone who does not
follow that particular leader is part of the problem and is not pure. Scholars depict this as a battle
between a “virtuous public” and “anti-elitism” (Busby, Gubler & Hawkins, 2019; Mueller,
2017). Hence, a major part of populist framing is the impurity and “out-group” nature of those
who disagree or disapprove of the populist leader and their ideology (Mueller, 2017).
Frequently, leaders will depend on fallacies to make their case to the public. In one study,
“widespread use of fallacies” were noted in the rhetoric of prominent populist leaders, with “ad
consequentiam” being the most frequented fallacy (Blassnig et al., 2018). Ironically, the paper
notes, “false analogies and red herrings” were among the least likely of fallacies to be employed
by populist leaders (Blassnig et al., 2018). All in all, populist leaders seek to frame blame on a
corrupt elite, perceived or actual, and make claims to “the people” in an effort to indirectly
define who is part of the group, and who is not.
Framing theory suggests that populist rhetoric works best when it targets those who have
a “perceived or actualized [view] of widespread government failures” (Busby et al., 2019). It
attempts to clearly separate a stagnant or corrupt organization with a virtuous public, or “the
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common man.” Organizations can be attacked if it is perceived to be a failure of representation,
especially when the opposition party is in power. Large groups can also be targeted if they are
perceived to be part of “systemic causes such as globalization or technological change” (Busby
et al., 2019).
Framing theory also pertains to how a populist candidate tailors their speech to the
individual. Populist leaders “encourage individuals to consider political problems in dispositional
terms rather than situational terms” (Busby et al., 2019). Dispositional framing seeks to blame a
person or group directly for problems, and that their actions were intentional and with
maleficence in mind. Conversely, situational framing is common among non-populist leaders
who blame impersonal forces outside of the control of individuals or groups for society’s
problems. Research on framing theory have found wide differences in use of dispositional
framing between populist and non-populist candidates (Busby et al., 2019). However, research
has also found that dispositional arguments only carry muster when there are widespread failures
that have been afflicting or perceived to be affecting a large enough group to carry political
weight.
Framing theory goes hand in hand with crisis performance. Crisis performance, as
described by Moffitt, details a six step process in which a failure, perceived or actual, is
transformed into a crisis to rally populist support. A populist leader must first identify the failure,
then link it to a wider framework. He or she must create a Manichean conflict and use media to
propagate their individual performance. Their solutions should be simple and always project
strong leadership. Finally, they must continue to propagate the crisis using the media and other
tools (Moffitt, 2014). Note that turning the failure into a crisis itself does not constitute populism
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always, but the “necessary precondition for populism is the performance” itself (Moffitt, 2014).
It is no surprise that a candidate such as Donald Trump, who starred on television and movies, is
able to harness the power of performance to generate voter support.
Predicting Outcomes
There are three research questions that pertain to the literature. First, does U.S. state-level
economic opportunity affect the amount of economic populist messaging used by candidates in
their speeches? Based on the literature, areas that are economically disaffected are more likely to
have a populist base. Therefore, it would make sense that populist leaders would utilize more
economic populist messaging in areas with lower economic opportunity. Second, what kind of
language do populists utilize? It is expected that Donald Trump will adopt language that pertains
to jobs, Americanism, and attack places that he perceives American jobs have fled to. For
Sanders, it is expected that he will employ language that pertains to economic inequality and
injustices. Finally, how do populists frame their message in a way that resonates with voters?
Predictively, it is expected that Donald Trump will operate using right-wing typologies, and
Bernie Sanders will utilize left-wing typologies. In typologies that have no ideological
undertones, it is likely to see symbiosis between the candidates.
Methodology
Within the first research question, the independent variable being measured is economic
opportunity. In order to measure this, data was provided by Opportunity Nation and Child
Trends. The data compiled was of 2016 U.S. State-level economic opportunity. Each state was
assigned a composite value between zero and one-hundred based on seven factors:
unemployment rate, median household income, the percent of the population below the federal
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poverty level, income inequality, access to banking, affordable housing, and access to broadband
internet service. The higher a state’s economic opportunity score, the better their economy.
To answer the first research question and later content analysis, speeches were compiled
from C-Span the UC Santa Barbara American Presidency Project. All speeches came from the
2016 U.S. Presidential Election, with a focus on primary speeches, given that both Donald
Trump and Bernie Sanders were candidates. However, to raise the number of speeches for
Donald Trump, speeches he made during the general election were included. Each state, if the
candidate spoke in them, received a maximum of one speech. If multiple speeches were given in
a state, the earliest speech by date was chosen. This was especially salient for Trump speeches,
as keeping the dates as close to the primary election was an attempt to gain more internal control
over the data.
After combing each site, fifteen Trump speeches and thirteen Sanders speeches were
compiled. Two of Trump’s speeches, one in New Hampshire, and one in Virginia, were
discarded. His speech in New Hampshire dealt solely with immigration and terrorism, while the
Virginia speech was dedicated to VA reform and Veteran’s causes. So as to not create an outlier
in the data, these were not used. As a final count, thirteen speeches were used for each candidate.
There were five states in which both candidates spoke: Arizona, Iowa, Michigan, New York, and
Pennsylvania. Trump-only speeches occurred in Colorado, Florida, Maine, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Washington. Sanders-only speeches occurred in California,
Delaware, Illinois, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.
Returning to the first research question, it is important to explain the coding mechanisms
used to define what is “economic messaging.” A subset of speeches of the candidates were
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chosen at random and were fully read, highlighting key words that were present during an
economic message or policy. In total, forty-two key words were selected with derivatives of the
base word possible (i.e “jobs” and “job”). The full list of economic key words can be found in
Appendix A. Each key word was searched for in the speech, and a determination was made
whether or not the key word was being used in an economic message or not. If it was determined
that the message was economic, then it went to a second test to determine if there were populist
elements in the message. To determine if the message had populism within, the list of populist
typologies was employed. The typology chart was determined by the literature that suggests
nativism, xenophobia, offshoring and outsourcing, globalism, and authoritarianism tend to be
right-wing typologies. On the left, a collective sense of losing out was used. Throughout the
literature, general populist themes arouse regardless of ideology such as anti-elitism,
exaggerations and breach of political norms, anti-establishment, and fighting for the people. If
the message employed an economic message within the key words, and displayed populist
typologies from the chart, the total number of sentences were recorded to then be divided by the
total amount of economic sentences. The percentage result is the dependent variable within the
first research question.
In order to create the word map, all economic populist messages were copied onto a
website that specializes in creating word maps. Words that contained three or less letters were
discarded, as the most likely candidates in this range are articles or contractions, neither of which
carry an economic nor populist meaning.
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Analysis
After analyzing the speeches made by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, and calculating
the total number of economic populist sentences by total number of sentences, the three research
questions presented earlier exhibit mixed results. As stated, the first research question dealt with
the interconnection between U.S. state-level economic data and the amount of economic
populism in candidate speeches. The prediction states lower economic opportunity states will
experience higher levels of economic populism in candidate speeches was not realized. In fact,
both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders demonstrated the opposite, in that, the higher a state’s
economic opportunity was, the more economic populism injected into candidate speeches.
Figure 1 - Donald Trump Economic Populist Regression Scatterplot
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Figure 2 - Bernie Sanders Economic Populist Regression Scatterplot

While Mr. Trump’s bivariate correlation (0.366) was not statistically significant, Senator
Sanders’ Pearson’s R value (0.771) was significant at the .01 level. One reason for the
significance of Sanders’ relationship is that his economic message was more concise and
targeted than Mr. Trump’s. At any rate, it is surprising to find the opposite trend than the
prediction. It is possible that in attempting to broaden the base of support, going after areas with
lower populist tendencies will yield higher margins of return. In areas that already support
populist leaders, the extent to which populist language sways opinion is minimal compared to
areas with low populist tendencies.
In researching the populist typologies used, one can get a better sense in the way in which
each leader made their economic message populist in nature. The literature suggests that
right-wing typologies such as nativism and xenophobia are more likely to be used by right-wing
populist leaders such as Donald Trump. On the other hand, left-wing populist typologies such as

49

a collective sense of losing out are more likely to be incorporated by left-wing leaders such as
Bernie Sanders.
Table 1 - Populist Typology Use in Economic Populist Messaging
Populist Typology

Donald Trump

Bernie Sanders

Nativism

9.45%

1.19%

Xenophobia

3.94%

0.00%

Offshoring/Outsourcing

4.72%

9.50%

Globalism

8.66%

0.00%

Anti-elitism

11.02%

69.12%

Exaggerate/Breach of Norms

24.02%

8.79%

Anti-establishment

17.32%

4.51%

“Fighting for the People”

3.54%

4.99%

Authoritarianism

10.63%

0.00%

Coll. Sense of Losing Out

6.70%

1.90%

It is somewhat surprising to visualize crossover between the two typologies. For one, the
typology “offshoring/outsourcing”, which is a typical right-wing typology, was used more often
by Bernie Sanders (9.50%) than Donald Trump (4.72%). Furthermore, the left-wing typology in
the “collective sense of losing out” was used more frequently by Donald Trump (6.70%) than
Bernie Sanders (1.90%). This suggests populist leaders, while rooted in other ideologies than just
populism itself, have the potential for ideological crossover. In looking at their core typologies, it
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is no surprise that Donald Trump’s most frequented typology is “Exaggeration/Breach of
Norms” with 24.02%, followed by “Anti-establishment” (17.32%), and “Anti-elitism” (11.02%).
Trump’s diversification of populist typologies mirrors his overall campaign strategy of a broad
message instead of specific policies. Contrastingly, Bernie Sanders’ most frequented typology
was used nearly three times more often that Donald Trump’s most frequented typology. The
staggering use of anti-elitism by Bernie Sanders should come as no surprise given his economic
message against corporate greed and the one percent, but to constitute nearly seventy percent of
all populist typology use is impressive.
The final research question dealt with the types of language populists use. The prediction
that Trump will employ language related to Americanism and jobs and Sanders will adopt
language related to economic inequalities was relatively successful.
Figure 3 - Donald Trump Word Map
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Figure 4 - Bernie Sanders Word Map

Based on the word map, Trump’s most used word was “jobs” and coupled with “losing”,
“American”, “China”, and “taken” it stands to reason that a major economic platform of Trump’s
was to return jobs to America and criticize countries that he perceives have taken them. This is in
line with the prediction. For Senator Sanders, frequently used words such as “people”, “Wall
Street”, “wealthiest”, “rigged”, “greed”, and “one percent”, highlight his anti-elite, economic
injustice message by targeting the economic one percent.
Overall, among the three research questions, the one that dealt with what language
populists use was most successful in its prediction. However, analysis of economic populist
messaging related to state economic data suggests other factors are at play in deciding the overall
economic message in each speech. In looking at the typologies employed by Trump and Sanders,
there may be a connection between typical ideological typologies and their utilization by each
candidate. Some crossover is evident, which highlights the broad nature of populism.
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Conclusions
The North American Free Trade Agreement and China’s acceptance into the World Trade
Organization sparked a rapid change in the U.S. economy which caused a decline in
manufacturing, and a rise in service-based jobs. Those who lost their jobs due to these two events
were more likely to enter the service industry, not only taking a pay cut, but working in a
different industry. These sharp economic changes mirrored the rise in demand for a leader who
could coherently voice their concerns. In due time, voices such as Mike Huckabee in the 2008
Presidential Election, and more recently in 2016 with Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders tapped
into the demand for populism. While the literature suggests a one-way avenue between the
supply and demand of populist leaders, it is reasonable to theorize that the true nature of populist
supply and demand is cyclical and involves two parties: the voter and the messenger. The voter,
having experienced economic or social shock, seeks an outlet to vent these frustrations. With
enough voters, a populist leader will recognize that certain messages will resonate with the
disaffected. However, the cycle does not stop here as the populist leader will inevitably draw
others to their camp that were not part of the original group. In a study completed by Busby,
Gubler, and Hawkins, those who had low populist sentiments and received dispositional
(populist) blame treatment…” looked just like those who were “high pretreatment populists”
(Busby et al., 2019). Their research would back up the notion that populist supply and demand is
indeed cyclical, however more research should be completed to verify this claim.
The results completed above is an introduction to qualitative and quantitative analysis
into specific policy platforms of candidates. It did not seek to analyze typologies of the whole
speech, but rather on economic messages alone. Future research could look into other subsets of
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candidate speeches to discern whether certain candidates are more likely to utilize populist
rhetoric on certain topics more than others. Additionally, further research must address the
puzzling question on the relationship between U.S. state-level economic opportunity and
economic populist messaging by candidates. This was by far the most surprising takeaway from
the paper, but multiple, larger case studies should be completed to ascertain whether this is a
trend.
In looking at how populists frame their message, the typologies they utilize, and how they
tie their message to fit certain populations and locations, the general population can become
more attuned to the messaging methods of populists. If it is true that populism is a threat to
liberal democracy, especially the United States, it is apparent that a better knowledge of
populism and the ways in which charismatic leaders take their message is necessary in critiquing
populism instead of blindly following it. It can be tempting to automatically follow someone
because one hears what they want to hear, but that is the point of populism. Populist leaders
frame their message specifically to the disadvantaged to gain their vote. In the upcoming U.S.
Presidential Election, two candidates stand out as populists, but many other candidates and
politicians are starting to adopt increasingly populist tones. It is more important now than ever to
have a grasp on how populists frame their message in order to truly understand their motives and
ideologies.
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Appendix
Appendix A - Economic Key Words
Prosper

Company

Employee

Debt

Deficit

Budget

Trillion

Trade

Tariff

China

Japan

Mexico

Economy

Wages

Income

Wealth

Middle Class

Wall Street

Job

Earning

GDP

Financial Institution

Bank

Glass-Steagall

Billionaires

Inequality

Poor

Factories

Business

Worker

Monopoly

Profit

Global

Products

Manufacturing

NAFTA

WTO

Greed

Dodd-Frank

Consumer

Fed

Federal Reserve
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